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Abstract 
  
This paper is the first to examine whether the loan loss provisioning behavior of 
Islamic banks is procyclical. From a dynamic panel data methodology, the empirical 
results show that loan loss provisioning in Islamic banks is indeed procyclical, as 
higher economic growth leads to a decline in loan loss provisions. A closer 
investigation is also conducted to examine whether capital management, income 
smoothing, or signaling behavior can alter the procyclicality of loan loss provisions. 
Specifically, our results document that only capital management behavior can 
overcome the procyclicality of loan loss provisions. This paper therefore advocates 
the importance of strengthening discretionary behavior in Islamic banks in terms of 
capital management using loan loss provisions, particularly during economic boom.  
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1. Introduction 
  In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the importance of 
strengthening prudential regulation in banking has acquired greater attention from 
academics and policy makers. This is because banks tend to behave imprudently 
during economic boom by lowering credit standards to boost loans, but strengthening 
credit standards during economic downturn when higher amount of loans is necessary 
to help economic recovery. Such bank behavior is often referred to as the 
procyclicality of bank credit risk management (Altman, 2005).  
  Prior literature on the procyclicality of bank credit management has been 
devoted to analyze the implication of loan loss provisioning system. Arpa et al. (2001) 
show that bank loan loss provisions are procyclical with business cycle in the case of 
Austrian commercial banks. Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) also show that higher 
economic growth is associated with a decline in loan loss provisions in banking. 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003) subsequently report that loan loss provisions indeed 
decreases following higher earnings and loan activities due to economic boom.  
  For commercial banks operating in OECD countries, loan loss provisioning 
system is also procyclical as in Bikker and Metzemakers (2005). Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2008) find the similar results for European banks, but they consider the 
impact of non-discretionary and discretionary provisions on loan growth
2
. 
Specifically, only discretionary provisions have a procyclical impact. Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2012) extend their prior work by including bank sample from developing 
countries. They show that non-discretionary provisions still have a procyclical impact 
regardless of whether or not income smoothing is conducted. Their results also show 
that the procyclicality of loan loss provisions is more pronounced in developing 
countries.   
  Another strand of literature divides loan loss provisions into two components: 
general and specific provisions (Cortavaria et al., 2000). While general provisions aim 
to mitigate unexpected credit risk in the future, specific provisions are used to cover 
expected credit risk. Accordingly, general provisions can be considered a forward-
looking component, while specific provisions are a backward-looking component. 
Because general provisions is a forward-looking component, whether or not general 
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provisions change is therefore affected by banks’ managerial discetionary behavior 
(Whalen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996). Prior litetrature indicates that the 
discretionary behavior of bank managers in determining the amount of loan loss 
provisions consists of capital management, income smoothing and signaling behavior 
(Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Ahmed et al., 1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001). This means 
that banks may increase loan loss provisions provisions to exercise different set of 
strategies; whether to enhance capital management, smooth earnings, signal its 
strength to market, or combination of these strategies.  
  In order to deal with the procyclicality of loan loss provisions, Fernandez de 
Lis et al. (2001) shed light on the importance of dynamic provisioning system, 
especially when discretionary provisions cannot offset the procyclicality of non-
discretionary provisions. In this regard, the dynamic provisioning system requires 
additional type of provisions, which is statistical provisions. The creation of statistical 
provisions will smooth total provisions (general, specific and statistical provisions) 
during economic downturn, because banks already create statistical provisions as 
buffer during economic boom. This implies that loans disbursement during economic 
downturn can be maintained and hence, supporting economic recovery processes.  
  While the implementation of dynamic provisioning system for conventional 
banks has been widely assessed,  there is no prior study that examines the similar 
issue for Islamic banks. For countries with dual banking system, understanding 
whether the current loan loss provisioning system in Islamic banks is procyclical 
provides important insights on the potential implication of dynamic provisioning 
system for Islamic banks. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is therefore the 
first attempt to investigate the procyclicality issues of loan loss provisions for Islamic 
banks. Our contribution in the present paper is twofold. First, we test how economic 
growth  affects loan loss provisions in Islamic banks. Hence, we may characterize the 
presence of procyclicality, if higher economic growth is associated with lower loan 
loss provisions. Second, we augment the analysis by examining whether the 
procyclicality of loan loss provisions, if any, is conditional on banks’ managerial 
discretionary behavior, which is related to capital management, income smoothing 
and signaling. As such, we may highlight whether or not the discretionary behavior of 
Islamic banks is sufficient to offset the procyclicality of loan loss provisions. 
Eventually, this paper may provide policy implications whether the implementation of 
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dynamic provisioning system is necessary for Islamic banks with different accounting 
standards compared to conventional banks. 
  As a matter of fact, the AAOIFI (Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions) – which has been established to harmonize regulatory 
frameworks that involve Islamic principles (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006) – also  
advocates the importance of implementing dynamic provisioning system for Islamic 
banks to cope with unexpected risks due to the difference in accounting treatment 
(Quttainah et al., 2011). Unexpected risks of Islamic banks may come from PLS 
(profit-loss sharing) contracts that basically have two types of investment account: 
Restricted Investment Account Holder (RIAH) and Unrestricted Investment Account 
Holder (UIAH). These contracts can be reported differently in bank income 
statement. Karim (2001) points out that some Islamic banks treat RIAH as equity or 
liability, while others consider it as off-balance sheet item.  
  Ultimately, since Islamic banks’ activities are based on PLS contracts, their 
credit risk management is also different than conventional banks. Understanding the 
procyclicality of loan loss provisions in Islamic banks is therefore crucial, as Islamic 
banks grow rapidly across countries from time to time. In 2016, Islamic banks around 
the world is predicted to grow by 90 percent with the total assets, reaching more than 
USD 1.8 trillion compared to only USD 939 billion in 2010 (Cevik and Charap, 
2011). As the presence of Islamic banks becomes substantial, its role in economic 
development will be more pronounced than before. In this respect, addressing the 
procyclicality issues of loan loss provisions in Islamic banks should be more of a 
concern, particularly during economic downturn. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our 
data and hypotheses development. Section 3 presents our methodology and variables. 
Section 4 describes empirical results, while Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data and hypothesis development  
2.1.  Data sources 
  For the purpose of this study, we retrieve a sample of 146 Islamic banks 
around the world from 1997 to 2012 covered by BankScope Fitch IBCA. Specifically, 
we retrieve balance sheet and income statement information of Islamic banks from the 
following countries: United Arab Emirates (10), Bangladesh (2), Bahrain (19), Brunei 
Darussalam (1), Egypt (2), UK (5), Gambia (1), Indonesia (3), Iraq (6), Iran (16), 
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Jordan (3), Kuwait (9), Cayman Islands (1), Lebanon (3), Mauritania (2), Maldives 
(1), Malaysia (17), Philippines (1), Pakistan (9), Palestinian Territory (2), Qatar (4), 
Russia (1), Saudi Arabia (4), Sudan (12), Singapore (1), Syiria (2), Tunisia (1), 
Turkey (4), and Yemen (4)
3
. We also include macroeconomic data such as real gross 
domestic product obtained from the World Bank.  
 
2.2.  Hypothesis development 
  The objective of this study is twofold. First, we aim to test whether the 
procyclicality of loan loss provisions occurs by running regressions of loan loss 
provisions on economic growth as explanatory variable of interest. Second, we test 
whether the procyclicality of loan loss provisions is conditional on Islamic banks’ 
managerial discretionary behavior comprising capital management, income smoothing 
and signaling.     
  For such purposes, we specify Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 to tackle the 
first and second objective, respectively:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Islamic banks build up higher loan loss provisions following economic 
boom 
 
Hypothesis 2 : Islamic banks’ behavior in building up loan loss provisions in 
response to economic growth depends on the degree of banks’ managerial 
discretionary behavior related to capital management, income smoothing or 
signaling. 
 
  Previous studies indeed document that bank capital management may affect 
loan loss provisioning behavior of banks (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Parker and 
Zhu, 2012). Specifically, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) report that banks with poor 
capitalization are less inclined to build up loan loss provisions, while Parker and Zhu 
(2012) show that income smoothing strategies tend to be adopted in well-capitalized 
banks in Japan and poorly-capitalized banks in India. In this context, the role of bank 
capital management and income smoothing can not be separated in examining the 
issues of procyclicality in banking. Phrased differently, aside from capital 
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management, income smoothing using loan loss provisions should also be examined 
whether it affects the procyclicality of loan loss provisions. In parallel, signaling 
strategies using loan loss provisions are also somehow related to income smoothing 
strategies, as banks may signal its strength when they may generate higher profits and, 
thus, loan loss provisions. For such reasons, Hypothesis 2 considers not only the 
discretionary behavior of Islamic related capital management, but also income 
smoothing and signaling to examine whether the impact of economic growth on loan 
loss provisions depends on managerial discretions.    
 
3. Methodology and variables 
  The methodology used in this paper comprises two stages. In the first stage, 
we test the occurrence of procyclical effect of loan loss provisions as stated in 
Hypothesis 1, while the second stage is to examine whether capital management, 
income smoothing or signaling using loan loss provisions during economic boom can 
offset the procyclicality of loan loss provisions as shown in Hypothesis 2.  
  Hypothesis 1 can be tested using the following equations in which we 
introduce the one-year-lagged value of dependent variable as control variable. 
 tititititi GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLPTA ,3,2,11,0,           (1a) 
 tititititi GROWTHNPLLTALLRTALLRTA ,3,2,11,0,           (1b) 
In Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b), we merely focus on the determinants of loan loss provisions 
that may reflect non-discretionary behavior of bank managers, because the 
procyclicality of loan loss provisions is mostly related to non-discretionary 
component of loan loss provisions (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008 & 2012). On the 
other hand, adding more variables reflecting discretionary component of loan loss 
provisions into Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b) will make the degree of freedom becomes 
smaller when we have only limited number of Islamic banks available in our sample.  
  From Eq. (1a), LLPTA is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. For 
robustness consideration, we also use the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets 
(LLRTA) as depenent variable in Eq. (1b). LTA is the ratio of total loans to total assets, 
while NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and GROWTH is the real 
economic growth rate at the country level.  
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  In the next turn, Hypothesis 2 can be tested using the following equations in 
which we add interaction terms between economic growth and three discretionary 
purposes of Islamic bank managers using loan loss provisions.  
 
 
ti
titititi
GROWTHCAPCAP
GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLPTA
,54
3,2,11,0,
* 


 
       (2a) 
 
ti
titititi
GROWTHCAPCAP
GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLRTA
,54
3,2,11,0,
* 


 
         (2b) 
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titititi
GROWTHEBTPEBTP
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,54
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* 


 
         (2c) 
 
ti
titititi
GROWTHEBTPEBTP
GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLRTA
,54
3,2,11,0,
* 


 
         (2d) 
    
ti
titititi
GROWTHSIGNSIGN
GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLPTA
,54
3,2,11,0,
* 


 
         (2e) 
 
ti
titititi
GROWTHSIGNSIGN
GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLRTA
,54
3,2,11,0,
* 


 
         (2f) 
 
Eq. (2a) and Eq. (2b) contain the interaction term between capitalization and 
economic growth (CAP*GROWTH) in order to examine the role of capital 
management in affecting the impact of economic growth on loan loss provisions. CAP 
is defined as the ratio of total equity to total assets. Meanwhile, the role of income 
smoothing in affecting the procyclicality of loan loss provisions due to economic 
growth is estimated using Eq. (2c) and Eq. (2d) by incorporating the interaction term 
between income smoothing and economic growth (EBTP*GROWTH). EBTP is the 
income smoothing variable defined as the ratio of earning before tax and provisions 
divided by total assets. Finally, Eq. (2e) and Eq. (2f) contain the interaction term 
between signaling and economic growth (SIGN*GROWTH) which aims to investigate 
how signaling behavior affects the link between economic growth and loan loss 
provisions. SIGN captures signaling behavior, which is measured by:  
)(5.0 ,1,
,1,
,
titi
titi
ti
TATA
ERER
SIGN





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ER is defined as earnings before tax and loan loss provisions, while TA is total assets.  
  Overall, we estimate Eq. (1a) to Eq. (2f) using a dynamic panel data 
methodology for several reasons. First, the current loan loss provisioning behavior 
might be affected by the last year’s provisioning behavior due to managerial learning 
and, thus, loan loss provisions are dynamic rather than static variable. Therefore, the 
use of dynamic panel data methodology is proper to control for dynamic movements 
of loan loss provisions. Second, loan loss provisions can be affected by explanatory 
variables introduced from Eq. (1a) to Eq. (2f), but those explanatory variables can 
also be affected by loan loss provisions. If this is the case, reverse causality problems 
might be an important drawback that acquires particular attention. The use of dynamic 
panel data methodology is also relevant, because it can avoid reverse causality 
problems between loan loss provisions and their determinants.  
  In terms of econometric procedure,  we follow Blundell and Bond (1998) to 
estimate dynamic panel data models as shown in Eq. (1a) – Eq.(2f). This method is 
referred to as the two-step system GMM estimation or the system GMM. The system 
GMM is shown to be more efficient than the standard GMM (Baltagi, 2005). We 
consider orthogonal transformations of instruments to control for possible cross-
sectional fixed effects, while we also include Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample 
correction to ensure for the validity of the system GMM. Finally, the system GMM is 
valid when both the AR(2) and Hansen-J test are not significant, indicating that there 
is no second order autocorrelation among errors and overidentifying restrictions are 
valid, respectively.   
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Results 
  In Table 1, we present descriptive statistics of variables used in this study. No 
potential outliers can be detected, as the values of each variable seem economically 
plausible. We also eliminate all zero values in each variable to ensure that unavailable 
data is not treated as zero in our model estimations.  Meanwhile, Table 2 presents the 
correlation structure of all variables. We can notice that all independent variables 
presented from Eq. (1a) to Eq. (2f) are not highly correlated and hence, potential 
multicollinearity problems are less likely to occur.  
 
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here] 
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  In Table 3, we document that Islamic banks use loan loss provisions for non-
discretionary purposes in which higher loan-to-asset ratio (LTA) and non-performing 
loans (NPL) are associated with higher loan loss provisions. These results are 
consistent with prior literature on the procyclicality of loan loss provisions in 
conventional banks (e.g. Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008 & 2012; Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2005). More importantly, loan loss provisions of Islamic banks are 
procyclical, as higher economic growth deteriorates loan loss provisions. Hypothesis 
1 is therefore not rejected. Our dynamic panel data models to test Hypothesis 1 are 
also valid, because both the AR(2) and Hansen-J test are not significant. Such 
procyclical behavior of Islamic banks in building up loan loss provisions is indeed 
consistent with the results obtained for conventional banks as in prior literature 
presented earlier.   
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
  Furthermore, we present our empirical results to test Hypothesis 2 in Table 4. 
Model 1 is addressed to test whether capital management using loan loss provisions 
affects the procyclicality of loan loss provisions, while Model 2 and Model 3 are to 
test the impact of income smoothing and signaling behavior using loan loss provisions 
on the procyclicality of loan loss provisions, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
  From Table 4, it is shown that higher loan loss provisions are still affected by 
the loan-to-assets ratio (LTA) and non-performing loans (NPL). In this context, the use 
of loan loss provisions for non-discetionary purposes as discussed earlier is not 
altered. Meanwhile, higher economic growth (GROWTH) still has a negative impact 
on loan loss provisions measured by either LLPTA or LLRTA. However, we find that 
only bank discretionary behavior related to capital management alters the 
procyclicality of loan loss provisions, as shown by the positive coefficients of 
interaction variable between capitalization (CAP) and economic growth (GROWTH)  
in Model 1 (Table 4). The positive coefficients of CAP*GROWTH  is also higher than 
the negative coefficients of GROWTH.  
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  For instance, if LLPTA is used as dependent variable, the negative impact of 
GROWTH on loan loss provisions indicating the procyclicality of loan loss provisions 
occurs when CAP is less than 24 percent. In other words, this may also indicate that 
the countercyclical effect of loan loss provisions is apparent if the equity-to-assets 
ratio exceeds 24 percent. The identical results occur when we use LLRTA as 
dependent variable, where the cut-off point of CAP is 3 percent in order to enable 
loan loss reserves become countercyclical.  
  All in all, loan loss provisions in Islamic banks with higher capitalization are 
countercyclical, because loan loss provisions increase in response to stronger 
economic growth. Islamic banks with higher capitalization are indeed more prudent 
by building up higher loan loss provisions during economic boom, which in turn 
enables them to decrease loan loss provisions in bad times. Consequently, banks with 
higher capitalization can boost loans disbursement during economic downturn. We 
therefore highlight that Islamic banks with higher capitalization may contribute well 
to economic recovery. Finally, our models estimated in Table 4 are valid, because the 
AR(2) test and the Hansen-J test are not significant at least at the 5 percent level.  
   
4.2. Robustness checks 
  In order to ensure the robustness of our empirical models, we modify the 
specification of our dynamic panel data models. Specifically, we follow Bouvatier 
and Lepetit (2008) by considering first-difference transformation instead of 
orthogonal deviation transformation of instruments. Table 5 and Table 6 present our 
results using this new specification. On the whole, the empirical results discussed 
earlier are not altered. All dynamic panel data models using first difference 
transformation of instruments are still valid, because the AR(2) test and the Hansen-J 
test are not rejected. 
 
[Insert Table 5 and Table 6 here] 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper is the first to examine whether the loan loss provisioning of Islamic 
banks is procyclical over business cycle. Our empirical results are supportive of the 
notion that loan loss provisions in Islamic banks are generally procyclical, because 
loan loss provisions decreases due to stronger economic growth. In other words, 
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Islamic banks’ provisioning behavior might deepen economic recessions, as loan loss 
provisions increases in response to a decline in economic growth.  
However, a closer investigation reveals that the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions can be offset by discretionary behavior of bank managers, particularly 
related to capital management behavior. In this sense, enhancing capital management 
using loan loss provisions as a discretionary behavior of Islamic bank managers 
during economic boom is more than sufficient to ensure that loan loss provisions 
increase in good times, but decrease in bad times. Accordingly, the use of dynamic 
provisioning system as recommended by the AAOIFI is not crucial for Islamic banks, 
because relying on the discretionary behavior of Islamic bank managers related to 
capital management using loan loss provisions can already offset the procyclicality of 
loan loss provisions.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LLPTA Ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets 694 0.0075819 0.0151546 -0.126497 0.1412412 
LLRTA Ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets 702 0.0264963 0.0379222 0.0001125 0.4414414 
LTA Ratio of total loans to total assets 999 0.4747414 0.2548028 2.41E-06 0.9927928 
NPL Ratio of non-performing loans to total assets 417 0.0870674 0.1334875 0.0000941 0.831972 
GROWTH Real gross domestic product growth 1684 0.0469603 0.0542033 -0.413 0.465 
CAP Ratio of total equity to total assets 1050 0.2621883 0.2636642 -0.5892856 1 
EBTP Ratio of earning before tax and provisions to total assets 724 0.0182807 0.043667 -0.4108263 0.2611041 
SIGN Signaling variable 585 0.0044359 0.0427708 -0.3834767 0.3486663 
 
Table 2. Correlation structure 
Variables LLPTA LLRTA LTA NPL GROWTH CAP EBTP SIGN 
LLPTA 1 
       LLRTA 0.2766 1 
      LTA 0.143 0.3512 1 
     NPL 0.3699 0.7021 0.0009 1 
    GROWTH -0.0648 -0.002 0.0428 -0.0077 1 
   CAP -0.1161 0.1479 0.0044 0.1388 0.0135 1 
  EBTP -0.1322 0.0619 0.3473 -0.1635 0.1967 -0.0158 1 
 SIGN 0.0123 -0.004 0.0188 -0.1135 -0.0321 -0.0018 -0.6156 1 
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Table 3. The procyclicality of loan loss provisions 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variables 
LLPTA LLRTA 
  
 
  
LLPTA(-1) 0.6973***   
  (0.144)   
LLRTA(-1) 
 
0.7768*** 
  
 
(0.035) 
LTA 0.0042*** 0.0091*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
NPL 0.0130 0.0619*** 
  (0.022) (0.013) 
GROWTH -0.0245** -0.0500*** 
  (0.009) (0.017) 
  
 
  
Observations 311 310 
Number of index 73 72 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.981 0.350 
Hansen-J test (p-value) 0.420 0.126 
Notes:  The definition of variables follows Table 1. Regressions are carried out using the system GMM following Blundell and Bond (1999) by taking 
orthogonal deviation of instruments into account and hence, we control for cross-sectional fixed effects. Models are valid if the AR(2) and Hansen-J test are 
not significant. ***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Table 4. Do capital management, income smoothing and signaling alter the procyclicality of loan loss provisions? 
Explanatory variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
LLPTA LLRTA LLPTA LLRTA LLPTA LLRTA 
 
            
LLPTA(-1) 0.6137***   0.6721***   0.5889***   
 
(0.105)   (0.121)   (0.162)   
LLRTA(-1)   0.8107***   0.7761***   0.8826*** 
 
  (0.051)   (0.051)   (0.088) 
LTA 0.0109*** 0.0099*** 0.0066*** 0.0095*** 0.0048* 0.0095** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
NPL 0.0143 0.0587*** 0.0081 0.0570** 0.0288 0.0315 
 
(0.019) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.037) 
GROWTH -0.0814*** -0.0097 -0.0333 -0.0506*** -0.0204** -0.0600** 
 
(0.030) (0.042) (0.025) (0.017) (0.010) (0.023) 
CAP -0.0233** -0.0169* 
 
      
 
(0.013) (0.010) 
 
      
CAP * GROWTH 0.3425*** 0.2666** 
 
      
 
(0.189) (0.342) 
 
      
EBTP     -0.0546 0.0052     
 
    (0.039) (0.045)     
EBTP *GROWTH     0.4644 -0.2104     
 
    (0.746) (0.609)     
SIGN         -0.0344 0.0177 
 
        (0.063) (0.059) 
SIGN*GROWTH         0.0099 -0.0764 
 
        (0.440) (0.737) 
 
            
Observations 311 310 311 300 256 249 
Number of index 73 72 73 68 68 64 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.724 0.342 0.946 0.351 0.398 0.355 
Hansen-J test (p-value) 0.453 0.155 0.325 0.083 0.554 0.145 
Notes:  The definition of variables follows Table 1. Regressions are carried out using the system GMM following Blundell and Bond (1999) by taking 
orthogonal deviation of instruments into account and hence, we control for cross-sectional fixed effects. Models are valid if the AR(2) and Hansen-J test are 
not significant. ***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. The procyclicality of loan loss provisions: First-difference transformation  
Explanatory wariables 
Dependent variables 
LLPTA LLRTA 
  
 
  
LLPTA(-1) 0.6474***   
  (0.146)   
LLRTA(-1) 
 
0.7247*** 
  
 
(0.040) 
LTA 0.0045*** 0.0112*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
NPL 0.0147 0.0604*** 
  (0.023) (0.018) 
GROWTH -0.0202* -0.0470** 
  (0.013) (0.020) 
  
 
  
Observations 311 310 
Number of index 73 72 
AR(2) test: p-Val 0.938 0.349 
Hansen-J test: p-Val 0.323 0.107 
Notes:  The definition of variables follows Table 1. Regressions are carried out using the system GMM following Blundell and Bond (1999) by taking first-
difference transformation of instruments into account and hence, we control for cross-sectional fixed effects. Models are valid if the AR(2) and Hansen-J test 
are not significant. ***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 6. Capital management, income smoothing, signaling and the procyclicality of loan loss provision: First-difference transformation  
Explanatory variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
LLPTA LLRTA LLPTA LLRTA LLPTA LLRTA 
 
            
LLPTA(-1) 0.5643***   0.6330***   0.5889***   
 
(0.101)   (0.128)   (0.162)   
LLRTA(-1)   0.7619***   0.7245*** 0.0048* 0.8826*** 
 
  (0.045)   (0.046) (0.003) (0.088) 
LTA 0.0125*** 0.0132*** 0.0050 0.0124*** 0.0288 0.0095** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.030) (0.004) 
NPL 0.0198 0.0578*** 0.0113 0.0533** -0.0204** 0.0315 
 
(0.021) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) (0.037) 
GROWTH -0.0941*** -0.0138 -0.0058 -0.0505***   -0.0600** 
 
(0.032) (0.039) (0.046) (0.019)   (0.023) 
CAP -0.0302** -0.0120 
 
      
 
(0.015) (0.012) 
 
      
CAP * GROWTH 0.4450** -0.1952 
 
      
 
(0.217) (0.302) 
 
      
EBTP     -0.0045 -0.0050     
 
    (0.083) (0.038)     
EBTP *GROWTH     -0.5048 -0.0052     
 
    (1.713) (0.346)     
SIGN         -0.0344 0.0177 
 
        (0.063) (0.059) 
SIGN*GROWTH         0.0099 -0.0764 
 
        (0.440) (0.737) 
 
            
Observations 311 310 311 300 256 249 
Number of index 73 72 73 68 68 64 
AR(2) test: p-Val 0.707 0.341 0.962 0.351 0.398 0.355 
Hansen-J test: p-Val 0.431 0.195 0.302 0.051 0.554 0.145 
Notes:  The definition of variables follows Table 1. Regressions are carried out using the system GMM following Blundell and Bond (1999) by taking first-
difference transformation of instruments into account and hence, we control for cross-sectional fixed effects. Models are valid if the AR(2) and Hansen-J test 
are not significant. ***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
